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ABSTRACT 
 
THE RHETROIC OF COLLABORATION: EXAMINING THE INCLUSIVE AND 
EXCLUSIVE RHETORIC IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
Chelsea Anne Lehmkuhl 
Western Carolina University (July 2016) 
Director: Dr. Diane Martinez 
 
In 2005, Tokyo was the dioxin capital of the world, a likely carcinogen and emitted 
byproduct of burning plastic (Braun n.p.). In an effort to reduce the city’s environmental impact 
and community health risk, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government instituted “Tokyo’s Big 
Change: The 10-Year Plan” in 2006 (Nagata n.p.). The 10-Year Plan and Tokyo Vision 2020, the 
environmental plan subsequently installed by the TMG after the 2011 tsunami and earthquake 
following the Fukushima disaster, are comprehensive plans that both outline eight major goals on 
the path to environmental sustainability, urban progress, and economic growth through 
ecological civility, industrial involvement, and inspired citizen participation (“Tokyo 
Committed”n.p.; “Creating the future” n.p.). My goal with this research is to examine the 
societal involvement and rhetorical framework of the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020, and 
compare this to current environmental policies and practices in the United States, such as the 
Clean Water Act, the President’s Climate Action Plan, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s press release regarding greenhouse gas emissions.  
iv 
The environmental, economic, and cultural implications and success of the 10-Year Plan 
and Vision 2020 exemplify its significance as a case study of the collaborative spirit and the 
progress that can be achieved on a national, and even global, level through communally and 
commercially inclusive communication On a larger level, my research aims to identify a 
collaborative model of sustainability that utilizes the economic and cultural environments present 
within reform rather than holding reform hostage as a declaration of authoritative power. By 
examining the 10-Year Plan, Vision 2020, and Japan’s Fun to Share programs and comparing 
them with the United States’ Clean Water Act and President’s Climate Action Plan, I aim to 
uncover a path to sustainable collaboration, at both the local and national levels, that utilizes 
communal, industrial, and environmental support as the foundation for progress. Moreover, I 
hope that my research helps change the current narrative of environmental reform from the 
dichotomous environment against economy view perpetuated by vacillating political regimes to a 
symbiotic approach that emphasizes the cultural significance of rhetorically collaborative 
environmental and economic processes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Under this communalist perspective, the teaching of technical or scientific writing 
becomes more than the inculcation of a set of skills; it becomes a kind of 
enculturation. We can teach technical or scientific writing, not as a set of 
techniques for accommodating slippery words to intractable things, but as an 
understanding of how to belong to a community. To write, to engage in any 
communication, is to participate in a community; to write well is to understand 
the conditions of one’s own participation—the concepts, values, traditions, and 
style which permit identification with that community and determine the success 
or failure of communication.  
—Carolyn Miller, 1979 
While Miller’s remarks about technical writing are nearly four decades old, they are 
perhaps more applicable today than when they were originally penned. With ever-growing 
industry, technology, and population come the consequential byproducts of progression, namely 
wasted resources and communication that can pose destructive environmental effects. Miller’s 
seminal essay “A humanistic rationale for technical writing” not only laid the groundwork for 
technical writing as an inclusive scholastic field, but also demonstrates the significance of 
technical writing in communal and cultural identity. It is a tool of understanding and belonging 
that utilizes experienced cultural truths. As Miller notes: 
Good technical writing becomes, rather than the revelation of absolute reality, a 
persuasive version of experience. To continue to teach as we have, to acquiesce in 
passing off a version as an absolute, is coercive and tyrannical; it is to wrench an 
ideology from belief. Much of what we call technical writing occurs in the context 
of government and industry and embodies tacit commitments to bureaucratic 
hierarchies, corporate capitalism, and high technology. If we pretend for a minute 
that technical writing is objective, we have passed off a particular political 
ideology as privileged truth. (616) 
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Technical writing, then, is a medium of epistemic experience that seeks to unite the “examination 
and understanding of one’s own activity and consciousness” with  “a more fruitful appreciation 
and critical understanding of two central forces in our culture, science and technology 
themselves” (Miller 617). My work examines both the collaborative inclusion and exclusion of 
economic and communal entities in environmental policies, particularly focusing on rhetorical 
analyses of the Tokyo 10-Year Plan, Tokyo Vision 2020, Japan’s Fun to Share Program, the 
Clean Water Act, and the President’s Climate Action Plan. These policies rhetorically present 
both the collaborative problems and solutions of local and national level environmental reforms.  
In 2005, Tokyo was the dioxin capital of the world, a likely carcinogen and emitted 
byproduct of burning plastic (Braun n.p.). In an effort to reduce the city’s environmental impact 
and community health risk, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government instituted “Tokyo’s Big 
Change: The 10-Year Plan” in 2006 (Nagata n.p.). The 10-Year Plan and Tokyo Vision 2020, the 
environmental plan subsequently installed by the TMG after the 2011 tsunami and earthquake 
following the Fukushima disaster, are comprehensive plans that both outline eight major goals on 
the path to environmental sustainability, urban progress, and economic growth through 
ecological civility, industrial involvement, and inspired citizen participation (“Tokyo 
Committed” n.p.; “Creating the future” n.p.). My goal with this research is to examine the 
societal involvement and rhetorical framework of the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020, and 
compare this to current environmental policies and practices in the United States, such as the 
Clean Water Act, the President’s Climate Action Plan, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s press release regarding greenhouse gas emissions. The environmental, economic, and 
cultural implications and success of the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 exemplify its significance 
2 
as a case study of the collaborative spirit and the progress that can be achieved on a national, and 
even global, level through communally and commercially inclusive communication. 
Methodology 
While a handful of books and papers mention the efforts of the TMG to transform Tokyo 
into an environmentally sustainable city, this research is limited to the environmental results; the 
rhetorical framework and communication of these policies has largely been ignored. My research 
into the collaborative aspects of the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 analyzes the potential 
application of these collaborative rhetorical frameworks to current environmental policies and 
practices in the United States. I believe that the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 show the power of 
collaboration between disciplines, and can serve as a model to increase social understanding and 
participation in environmental, economic, and cultural processes1. Moreover, the 10-Year Plan 
and Vision 2020 exemplify the symbiotic relationship between knowledge and power as 
described by scholar Bernadette Longo in Spurious Coin, which details the history of science, 
industry, and technical writing. As Longo’s work demonstrates, properly communicated 
knowledge powers the economy and increases the value of that economy. Miscommunications or 
erroneously reported knowledge, though, degrade this economy. The same can be said in 
environmental reform; while collaborative reform harnesses the knowledge of industry, 
environmental, and communal stakeholders to create informed truths that improve societal well-
being, non-collaborative reforms leverage authority for political clout, which ultimately damages 
the communication between environmental and industrial stakeholders at the expense of public 
wellbeing. Concisely, non-collaborative reforms degrade the coinage of environmental policy; 
1 Note: As this is a relatively new topic that has yet to be written about, my research utilizes 
some translated newspaper articles and translated information obtained from the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government’s website.  
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rather than augmenting communal and industrial education and partnership, non-collaborative 
reforms hinder lasting environmental progress and communal well-being by essentially minting 
partial truths enflamed with biases that pit environmentally-sound practices against industrial 
gains. These practices place governmental enforcement agencies in the precarious position of 
choosing between big money industries and environmental welfare.  
The 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 utilize the power of Tokyo’s living assets as a cradle-
to-cradle approach to urban sustainability (McDonough and Braungart 165). In this regard, the 
10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 are rhetorical landmarks in policy and power; both utilize the 
collective life that was once killing Tokyo as a means of rebirth through the collaborative 
symbiosis of disciplines and authoritative influence. On a larger scale, both policies also 
exemplify Miller’s ideal of communal belonging and Professor Tom Tyler’s theory of social 
cooperation – which argues for public buy-in via trust and acceptance in order for governmental 
policies to succeed – and use this shared identity of positive change across environmental, 
industrial, and communal sectors to inspire further collaboration. Tyler’s observation that 
“People will only change their behavior when they feel that there is a reasonable risk of being 
caught and punished for wrongdoing. . . they are evaluating whether they believe that the 
authorities are effectively managing the problem of crime and social order,” hits on two key 
points necessary for both collaboration and sustainability: deterrence and trust (71). While 
policies must be consistently enforced to deter wrongdoers for fear of punishment, authorities 
must also gain the trust of the stakeholders involved. My research focuses on these two areas of 
environmental policy, using reforms in Japan and the United States as case studies, to highlight 
the overwhelming need for rhetorical collaboration in policies.  
To guide my research, I will analyze these reforms using the following questions: 
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● What entities are included and excluded from this reform? 
● What does this reform intend to accomplish and for whom? 
These questions will serve as my compass of sorts in my research, as they guide my analysis of 
environmental reforms to its epistemic origins: who is benefiting from these reforms, and why? 
Though basic, these questions are the foundation of Miller’s essay for inclusion, Longo’s 
knowledge economy, and Tyler’s cooperation theory. Using these works, my research analyzes 
the intent and feasibility of reform rather than merely measuring its reported success, which is 
based largely on dollar amounts, self-reported statistics, and the political agenda inherent within 
reforms. On a larger level, my research aims to identify a collaborative model of sustainability 
that utilizes the economic and cultural environments present within reform rather than holding 
reform hostage as a declaration of authoritative power. By examining the 10-Year Plan, Vision 
2020, and Japan’s Fun to Share programs and comparing them with the United States’ Clean 
Water Act and President’s Climate Action Plan, I aim to uncover a path to sustainable 
collaboration, at both the local and national levels, that utilizes communal, industrial, and 
environmental support as the foundation for progress. Moreover, I hope that my research helps 
change the current narrative of environmental reform from the dichotomous environment against 
economy view perpetuated by vacillating political regimes to a symbiotic approach that 
emphasizes the cultural significance of rhetorically collaborative environmental and economic 
processes.  
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CHAPTER ONE - THE TOKYO 10-YEAR PLAN, TOKYO VISION 2020, AND JAPAN'S 
FUN TO SHARE PROGRAM: EXAMINING COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES TO 
REFORM 
‘Making sense’ within a framework of contests for knowledge legitimation is not 
merely a ‘kind of collaboration.’ From a critical point of view, making sense for 
the victor is not making sense for the vanquished, who might ask why their 
knowledge must be silenced.                       
—Bernadette Longo, 2000               
In Spurious Coin, Longo details the convoluted cultural history of technical writing, the 
relationship between scientific knowledge and power, and the discord between the various types 
of knowledge creators and technical writers, which ultimately affects the knowledge economy’s 
value and coinage process. Longo’s historical account of technical writing in the United States 
specifically acknowledges the collaborative gap inherent within competitive frameworks: the 
victor’s version of knowledge is legitimized as one of the “spoils of war,” while the opponent’s 
knowledge is discarded as inherently inferior (Longo 15). This binary approach to knowledge 
legitimization privileges a single view regardless of the parties affected and stakeholder 
involvement. Instead of perpetuating this trend of conquest, Japan has used its recent 
environmental policies to unite disparate leaders. Rather than focusing on a singular framework 
from the victor’s agenda, as discussed in the next chapter, Japan’s reforms emphasize 
collaborative involvement and wellbeing by connecting environmental and industrial leaders 
with political and financial resources to involve and educate communities. As discussed further 
in this chapter, reforms such as the Tokyo 10-Year Plan, Vision 2020, and Japan’s Fun to Share 
program prioritize collaboration to benefit communal wellbeing. Indeed, one of the tenets 
throughout these reforms, and in Japan’s Basic Environmental Plan is participation: “to build a 
society where all parties, including the central and local governments, corporations, citizens, and 
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private organizations, participate voluntarily and actively in environmental conversation 
activities, cooperate, and share burden fairly” (“The Basic Environment Plan” n.p.). To build a 
sustainable society, we must first build a sustainable foundation for that society, including the 
regulations we use to serve and protect societal needs. The Tokyo 10-Year Plan, Vision 2020, 
and Japan’s Fun to Share program embody this sustainable approach to reform and serve as case 
studies in my research.                                                           
Transforming Tokyo: From a Wartime Rebuilding Environmental Disaster to a 
Collaborative Leader in Cultural Reform 
The long history of Tokyo, Japan is an interwoven tapestry of resilient valor and humble 
origins. The venerated economic entity has battled the beasts of war, erased the scars of 
bombardment and restored a flourishing population rivaling major metropolises worldwide. The 
brightest achievement, though, lies not in Tokyo’s venerable lineage, but in the city’s 
rejuvenating future. The Tokyo 10-Year Plan comprises environmental responsibility with 
thoughtful economic and cultural inclusion, placing Tokyo at the forefront of the collaborative 
era. Moreover, the 10-Year Plan reinforces the meaning of Tokyo’s name, “Eastern Capital,” and 
firmly plants Tokyo’s environmental reform on the forefront of collaborative progress (“History 
of Tokyo” n.p.). This reform carefully considers the rich history of Tokyo’s environment, 
culture, and economics, and is a landmark in closing the collaborative gap in environmental 
reform. 
World War II found Tokyo as a major target for air raids. The city was shelled with 
explosives over one hundred times while the country was enveloped by the total destruction of 
two mushroom shaped clouds, the world’s first atomic bombs (“History of Tokyo” n.p.) Scarce 
vestiges of the once booming city remained, covered with ash as the city was reduced to embers. 
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Much of Tokyo’s populace fled to the countryside to escape the death-struck city, dwarfing 
Tokyo’s 1945 population to half of that five years earlier (“History of Tokyo” n.p.). 
With Japan’s surrender in August of 1945 came Allied occupation of the country, a 
previously alien notion in Japanese history (“History of Tokyo” n.p.; “Background” n.p.). Under 
Allied control, the new Constitution of Japan was created and implemented before the country 
regained full sovereignty in 1952 (“History of Tokyo” n.p.). The 1950s became a time of postwar 
rehabilitation for Tokyo as the Japanese government emphasized the development of 
manufacturing industries and infrastructure (“History of Tokyo” n.p.). As a result of such 
prioritization, Japan was able to transform subsequent devastation into the world’s second-largest 
economy in 1966 in what is widely described as the “economic miracle” (“Japan” n.p.). The 
1964 Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo broadcasted the city to a global audience, stunning 
international spectators with the city’s amazing economic turnaround less than twenty years after 
the destruction wrought by World War II (“History of Tokyo” n.p.; “Japan” n.p.). 
Environment 
Today, Tokyo is a thriving, modern metropolis with an agglomerated population of 
nearly 38 million, including the administrative borders of the city line (Cox n.p.). The city is 
composed of 23 wards and houses a vital industrial economy competitive in international trade. 
However, the rapidity of Tokyo’s major metropolitan developments has led to gross 
environmental abuse, traffic congestion, and deficient disaster preparations that still plague the 
city, as evidenced by the Fukushima nuclear disaster and subsequent tsunami in 2011 (“History 
of Tokyo” n.p.; Kiger n.p. ). 
The Edo period of Tokyo’s history reflected a conscious city design centered on the 
surrounding waterways, an objective Tokyoites in the TMG want to reestablish, as well as 
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emphasizing the city’s greenery (“History of Tokyo” n.p.; “Eight” n.p.). A 2006 estimate showed 
about 486,000 roadside trees in Tokyo; the goal is to more than double this total, reaching one 
million trees within 10 years. Furthering the greenery effort is the creation of Umi-no-Mori – Sea 
Forest – out of 12.3 million tons of refuse from the Tokyo Bay Landfill (Nagata n.p.). The 88-
hecatre forest is bare save for some previously planted trees. The goal is to plant a total of 
480,000 trees to transform the onetime landfill into a forest sitting on Tokyo Bay. As Nagata 
notes, the massive increase in carbon dioxide-absorbing greenery will provide an environmental 
cushion for Tokyo, which is among the world’s top CO2 emitters (n.p.). 
While Japan has set a national goal of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions six percent 
by 2012 from 1990 levels, as Edahiro notes, Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro Ishihara, set a more 
ambitious goal for the city. Tokyo plans to cut CO2 emissions by 25 percent from 2000 levels by 
2020 (Edahiro n.p.). The objective of the TMG is to have the lowest environmental burden of 
any city in the world. To reach such steep standards, the “Fund to Promote Measures against 
Climate Change” was created with a budget of 50 billion yen, nearly $4.3 billion in U.S. dollars, 
in 2007 (Edahiro n.p.; “Eight” n.p.). Other measures include the use of energy-efficient 
alternatives, such as solar power, and the use of bio-diesel fuel, composed mainly of vegetable 
oil, which was introduced to Tokyo’s metropolitan busing system (“Eight” n.p.). In 2009, nearly 
three years into the plan, Tokyo became the site of the greenest marathon in history. The Tokyo 
Marathon utilized hybrid cars and buses to escort athletes and bystanders while jackets and caps 
were fashioned from recycled polyester and water cups constructed from thinned lumber 
(“Tokyo Committed” n.p.). 
To alleviate Tokyo’s overwhelming daytime traffic congestion as workers flock to the 
city, the TMG announced plans to establish three loop roads constructed around 600 main points 
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of congestion. The roads will effectively link land, sea, and air transportation and distribution 
networks, reducing transportation costs and two to three million tons of CO2 emissions per year. 
The three loop road design also enables more efficient transportation routes, critical to disaster 
preparedness (“Eight” n.p.). 
Economics 
Though the 10-Year Plan seems too idealistic and costly for implementation, the TMG 
has backed the plan with its pocketbook and various policies. To enable businesses to meet the 
newly imposed environmental demands, such as the reduced CO2 emissions allowed, the TMG 
allotted 33.6 billion yen, $337 million U.S., for businesses in 2008. For all environmental 
projects in 2008, the TMG allocated nearly seven trillion yen, about $70 billion U.S. (“Japan” 
n.p.). 
Enacting the 10-Year Plan received some opposition from the business sector as 
companies heard the unmistakable sound of checks being penned for environmental upgrades. 
JFE Steel Corporation, for example spent 362 billion yen, approximately $3.6 billion U.S., 
simply in energy savings related investments, and a whopping 507 billion yen, a little over $5 
billion U.S., in improvements to reduce hazardous emissions of pollutants into the city’s air and 
water supply. The steel producer was also forced to find a cleaner means to power its mill. In 
place of the traditional coke that is used in steel mills, plastic pellets created from recycled 
beverage labels and caps now power the mill, encouraging recycling practices and reducing the 
usage of coke, a derivative of coal (“Japan” n.p.).  
Additionally, the TMG instituted an Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 2002, and 
revamped the ETS in 2010 as part of the 10-Year Plan. This enhanced ETS requires absolute 
caps on CO2 emissions of the 1,400 facilities, representing 40percent of Tokyo’s industrial and 
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commercial sector, required to participate. In this system, large-scale facilities must provide five-
year reductions plans along with annual progress reports. Non-compliant corporations face fines, 
up to about $5,000 USD per occurrence, and the names of these facilities are published as a 
means of public denouncement. The ETS essentially forces corporations to adapt to the changing 
environmental regulations, or face fines, communal shaming, and potential extinction (“World’s 
Carbon Markets” 2-3).  
Culture 
From the social sector, Tokyo has made the involvement of Tokyoites a key feature of its 
ambitious 10-Year Plan. Students from local schools took part in tree planting for Umi-no-Mori 
while pupils fortunate enough to have received grassed over schoolyards are in charge of the 
implied maintenance (Nagata n.p.). Citizens are encouraged to attend meetings detailing energy 
alternatives, such as the use of solar photovoltaic systems, and energy conservation methods 
(Edahiro n.p.).  
Home to one of the world’s fastest aging population, Tokyo aims to create an urban 
model, the first of its kind, designed around a rapidly aging society. To ensure senior Tokyoites 
remain a vital part of society, the TMG will promote an active lifestyle for elderly residents, 
particularly in the workforce with the creation of some 30,000 occupations specifically for the 
disabled. Additionally, the “Fund to Ensure Health and Welfare” will be established to promote 
prevention and treatment of Alzheimer’s disease (“Eight” n.p.). 
Besides integrating Tokyo’s growing senior population into the city’s diverse industries, 
“Tokyo’s Big Change” also focuses on enhancing the metropolis’ global appeal. An emphasis on 
Japanese tradition conflated with an air of modernism will act as the centrifuge for areas such as 
Ueno Park, which boasts the most cultural facilities in Japan. The goal is to boost tourism by 
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establishing Tokyo as the cultural center of Asia and utilizing a universal design bent on 
multicultural feasibility and the elimination of language barriers (“Eight” n.p.). 
Recognizing the impossibility of such goals without the assistance of a willing populace, 
the 10-Year Plan sets out to create a society of motivated individuals pursuing their ambitions. 
The collective goal of bettering Tokyo reflects ambitions of a globally honored city while the 
formation of the “Continuing Education Scholarship” encourages former students to reenter 
school. Nonprofit organizations and volunteer opportunities will also be utilized and strongly 
encouraged to Tokyo’s youths (“Eight” n.p.). 
Fukushima Disaster and Tokyo Vision 2020 
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami rocked Japan, 
particularly Tokyo, and caused power and cooling failures to the reactors at the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi plant. To date, this disaster has caused an estimated 25 
trillion yen, about $300 billion USD, in damages, and the total environmental impact has yet to 
be assessed (“Japan Earthquake” n.p.). According to a 2015 United Nations University article, 
more than 32 million Japanese citizens are still reeling from the effects of the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster, and elevated radiation levels remain a top concern nearly five years after the incident. 
While the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has estimated that the “total atmosphere 
release of radioactive material from the Fukushima nuclear disaster . . . to be less than 15 percent 
of that emitted by the Chernobyl accident,” environmentalists such as Nathalie Gysi of Green 
Cross Switzerland, have found that “‘the number of people affected by radiation in Japan has 
tripled compared to Chernobyl’” (Smith n.p.). In addition to the increased cancer risk this poses, 
Japan’s waters remain a critical concern, as contaminated water continues to flow into the Pacific 
at an estimated rate of 0.3 terabecquerels of the radiative substance cesium-137 per month. At 
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the time of the disaster, an estimated “5,000 to 15,000 terabecquerels” spewed from the plant 
(Kiger n.p.). As a point of comparison for the magnitude of this disaster, “the atomic bomb 
dropped on Hiroshima released 89 terabecquerels of cesium-137 when it exploded” (Kiger n.p.). 
As evidenced from the Fukushima disaster and Japan’s continued use of nuclear energy, Japan is 
far from an environmental utopia and still suffers from the same environmental concerns that 
plague developed nations, such as the United States. While environmental woes are an inevitable 
part of growth and industrialization, Japan and Tokyo are at least using their policies as a cultural 
framework for success and sustainability despite changes in political regimes.   
While the name and governmental personnel from the 10-Year Plan have changed, 
Tokyo’s cultural reform goals, rebranded as Tokyo Vision 2020 remain inherently the same: to 
cohesively integrate environmental and social initiatives with economic progress to promote the 
cultural brand of Tokyo as a supportive and advanced international beacon. Moreover, like the 
10-Year Plan, Tokyo Vision 2020 focuses on eight strategies for reform that specifically 
prioritize interdependent environmental, economic, and cultural progress. This time around 
though, Tokyo has the 2020 Olympic Games as their center stage.   
Analysis of Goals 
By targeting Tokyo’s youth and elderly populations in the goals while providing 
increased daycare services and funding the return to school program for further career 
development, the TMG has effectively bookended its largest demographic: those who have 
children but are not yet elderly. Indeed, Figure 1 below shows that approximately 64 percent of 
Tokyo’s population falls within the working-age category (“Population of Tokyo” n.p.).  
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With this data in mind, it is easy to see the angle of the TMG’s goals; the onus of communal 
involvement in the 10-Year Plan falls on the working-age population who must keep in mind the 
wellbeing of their children, their parents, and themselves. Thus, by prioritizing the involvement 
of their largest population segment, and providing the funding for these supportive programs, the 
TMG effectively ensured the cultural success of its goals. 
While Tokyo’s environmental policies emphasize cultural participation, a look at the 
most recent environmental policy of the United States highlights an entirely different trend. For 
example, there is no mention of cultural goals, ambitions, or citizen participation in “The 
President’s Climate Action Plan;” rather, this plan focuses on abstract environmental and 
industrial concepts, such as “Managing Drought,” “Developing Actionable Climate Science,” 
and “Enhancing Multilateral Engagement with Major Economies” (“President’s Climate Action 
Plan” 2-3). Even the section entitled “Building Stronger and Safer Communities and 
Infrastructure” focuses only on the actions of various governmental agencies, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“President’s Climate Action Plan” 12). Whereas the Tokyo 
10-Year Plan is a communally involved effort that relies on its citizens for success, the most 
recent environmental policy of the United States ignores its populace and instead relies on the 
Figure 1 - Changes in population composition by three age groups (“Population of Tokyo” 
n.p.) 
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minority in power to create lasting change. The rhetoric used by the US places the environmental 
goals of its policy in a separate arena from society; while society is impacted by the enactment of 
this policy and its effects, “The President’s Climate Action Plan” lacks the cultural progression 
apparent in the rhetoric of the Tokyo 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020. Indeed, as Longo notes,  
If technical communication is the mediator between technology and what we have 
come to term ‘users,’ technical communication practices work to conquer users’ 
naïve know-how and reformulate these naïve practices into scientific discourse. In 
so doing, technical communication participates in a writing that conquers naïve 
knowledge by educating it into the technologies of scientific disciplines. Thus, 
technical writing participates in an economy of scientific knowledge and power 
within our culture. (17) 
While the reported statistical success of these reforms has yet to be determined, the larger victory 
inherent in both the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 is the culture of collaboration that has been 
enacted through rhetorical policy. The 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 are trademarks of Tokyo’s 
culture rather than its fleeting political leaders; these reforms transcend the binary victor and 
vanquished, and the rhetoric of these reforms are the embodiment Miller’s “enculturation” while 
exemplifying Longo’s knowledge economy (Miller 617; Longo 17). Rather than pitting 
environmental reforms against economic initiatives that waver between political parties, Tokyo 
reinvented its epistemic understanding of reform and culture through rhetoric that unites public, 
government, and industry while advancing the knowledge economy. Technical writing, then, is a 
crucial part of culture and should be a unifying force of cultural progression rather than a mere 
piece of the binary puzzle that hinges on naïve, limiting rhetoric that has failed to incorporate 
communal ‘users.’  
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From the Communal to the National Level: Japan’s Fun to Share Program 
Taking a page out of the TMG’s book, Japan’s Ministry of the Environment launched the 
“Fun to Share” climate change campaign in March of 2014. According to the Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation (JTUC), the Fun to Share program is the successor to The National 
Movement to Stop Global Warming, and  
aims to create a low carbon society by national and local governments, industrial 
labor and management, local society and individual Japanese working together 
and sharing information/technology/knowledge that will lead to the creation of 
stable low carbon society. The intention is to spread the movement like a chain 
reaction so that ‘innovations in our lifestyles’ can spring from Japan and move 
worldwide. (JTUC n.p.) 
Moreover, as Eco Business reports, high school students were designated as “‘communicators’ to 
help spread the word of energy conservation” while celebrities such as Koichi Wakata, Japan’s 
International Space Station commander gave the program his approval, stating “‘I’m now 440 
kilometres above the Earth at the International Space Station. The Earth floating in the darkness 
of space is really beautiful. But the Earth is facing a big issue of climate change. I, Koichi 
Wakata, astronaut of JAXA, will join in the climate change campaign, Fun to Share’” (“Japan 
Launches” n.p.). Not to be left out of this national initiative, organizations such as SoftBank 
Corporation, Hitachi Construction Machinery, AOI Pro, and the Japan Business Federation to 
name a few, have publicly supported the Fun to Share Program.  
Like its local level predecessor, the Fun to Share Program utilizes history and culture to 
create a reform based solely on cooperation. Indeed, the foundation of the reform is utilizing 
Japan’s citizens and “calls on individuals to share whatever they’re doing that makes use of 
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everyday ingenuities or the latest technologies. In short, anything useful that is climate friendly. 
Seeing the changing individual lifestyles leads to saving the global environment is a realization 
that is already a step in the right direction” (Kawasaki n.p.). Additionally, like the 10-Year Plan, 
the Fun to Share program is a response to growing environmental concerns. Although Japan 
reached its CO2 emissions goals for 2005-2009, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster 
decimated clean power generation and the goal to continue decreasing CO2 emissions hit a bump. 
Despite this setback, though, Japan invested in LED lights to reduce power usage, and just a few 
years later launched the Fun to Share program. 
The Fun to Share program represents Japan’s continuous path to sustainable reforms. 
Like the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 within Japan’s capital, the Fun to Share program 
similarly captures the attention of Japan’s citizens by calling for active citizen participation as a 
primary means to its success. By prioritizing citizen participation as an integral means to 
achieving emissions goal, the Ministry of the Environment effectively places the Fun to Share 
program atop the communal priority list, which in turn makes the 
program a priority to business and industry leaders in Japan. 
Moreover, this program is designed for global impact. As Figure 2 
to the right shows, even the logo for the Fun to Share program 
encourages participation. Environment Minister Nobuteru Ishihara 
has said that “The round blue shape of the logo is the Earth. The 
Earth is what supports our campaign. It represents our determination to consider the Earth with 
tremendous concern” (“Japan Launches” n.p.). With the 10-Year Plan and Fun to Share program, 
Japan is effectively establishing itself as a leader in sustainability by enabling its citizens and 
inspiring participation through collaborative reforms.  
Figure 2 – Japan’s Fun to 
Share logo (“Japan 
Launches,” n.p.) 
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Conclusion 
My goal with this research is to demonstrate the value of the 10-Year Plan, Vision 2020, 
and Fun to Share program as case studies for effective communal, scholarly, and commercial 
collaboration to achieve goals and establish a higher quality of living. I believe that these reforms 
show the power of collaboration between disciplines, and can serve as models to increase social 
understanding and participation in environmental, economic, and cultural processes. At the 
beginning of my research, I established two fundamental research questions to guide my work: 
what entities are included and excluded from this reform, and what does this reform intend to 
accomplish? Admittedly, the first question is somewhat difficult for me to answer, as an outsider 
looking in at Tokyo’s processes and policies, beyond the theoretical framework of the reforms 
and their ideal function. Given the approach and scope of the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 
though, it is clear that both reforms are focused on a culturally-inclusive epistemology; rather 
than tackling just environmental issues, the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 incorporate 
environmental issues with economic progress and communal well-being as a city-centered 
approach to total reform. While the Fukushima disaster and continued use of nuclear energy 
highlight prominent areas of environmental concern for Japan, the theoretical framework of 
Japan’s reforms, which my research is focused on, is quite promising as a means of collaborative 
and unifying technical writing, as advocated by both Miller and Longo. Moreover, Japan’s Fun 
to Share Program is smaller in scope than the 10-Year Plan and its predecessor, Vision 2020, but 
shows the same fundamental emphasis on communal and industrial inclusion.   
The second question, what does this reform intend to accomplish, acts as a cultural 
barometer of sorts in viewing the framework of each reform. In the case of Japan’s reforms, the 
intended accomplishments are culturally-focused rather than strictly statistical. For example, the 
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Supportive Environment strategy of the Vision 2020 focuses on supporting “the areas of health 
and welfare and medical care” to “pass on a solid sense of security to following generations” 
(“Strategy 5” 39). Moreover, part of this strategy also aims to “strengthen the initiatives to 
support to the lives of residents far into the future” (“Strategy 5” 39). While this strategy 
contains numeric benchmarks for performance, such as increasing employment for the disabled 
by 40,000 new jobs by the end of fiscal year 2024, the intent of Vision 2020 is wholeheartedly 
cultural in its holistic and organic approaches; Vision 2020 is Tokyo’s vision of their cultural, 
economic, and environmental future. These reforms are more than just policies to curb 
environmental trespasses; they are Miller’s “enculturation” and Longo’s currency that both aim 
to “see beyond our current scientific knowledge/power system” and “transform it into a system 
through which we can better address our complex social problems” (Miller, 617; Longo, 166). 
Although Japan’s environmental practices are far from perfect, their reforms establish a 
desperately needed collaborative rapport that transcends the transient environmental and political 
realms, and uses technical writing as a means of inclusive cultural change.   
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CHAPTER TWO - THE DIVIDED ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES: EXAMINING THE METHODOLOGY AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT, THE CLEAN AIR ACT, AND THE PRESIDENT'S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 
But as long as modern industry is so destructive, attempting to only make it less 
bad is a fatally limited goal. . . Instead of presenting an exciting and inspiring 
vision of change, conventional environmental approaches focus on what not to 
do. Such proscriptions can be seen as a kind of guilt management for our 
collective sins, a familiar placebo in Western culture.  
     —William McDonough and Michael Braungart, 2002 
Until the passage of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972, dumping industrial waste and 
raw sewage into local rivers and waterways was a common practice throughout the United 
States. Some waterways became so polluted, such as the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland or Lake 
Erie, that “‘no visible life, not even low forms such as leeches and sludge worms’” were visible 
(Salzman n.p.). Indeed, water conditions were so horrendous that the Cuyahoga River actually 
caught fire on numerous occasions, and it was a fire in 1969 that caught the country’s attention 
and demanded reform. While the published photos show the polluted river ablaze, the photos 
were actually from a separate fire on the river in 1952; the now infamous 1969 Cuyahoga River 
fire was considered quite small in comparison to other fires in the river’s history, and was 
extinguished so quickly that no photographs were taken (Latson n.p.). Nonetheless, the image of 
the burning river became emblazoned in the public’s mind, and that relatively small river fire has 
had a monumental impact on water reform. While the CWA remains one of the greatest 
historical environmental successes, its rhetoric, scope, and partnership are now questioned as 
relics of a previous era (Salzman n.p.; Deng n.p.). Indeed, while the CWA asserts the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the omnipotent overseer of water quality standards, 
industry wastewater standards, and pollutant discharge regulations, the EPA has been an 
alarmingly inconsistent authority of its own regulations and enforcement standards (“History of 
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the CWA” n.p.). The President’s Climate Action Plan (CAP) is another, albeit newer, national 
environmental reform that contains rhetoric that distances the public from its proposed policies 
despite its communal impact. Though these reforms were designed to protect public and 
environmental well-being, they lack consistent historical support from key stakeholders, 
particularly political and industrial leaders. These reforms aim to make egregious environmental 
trespasses “less bad” rather than addressing the root of the problem: lacking collaboration that 
pits environmentally sound practices that protect communal health against the prospect of 
economic woes due to industrial layoffs and shortsighted implementation costs, which also 
negatively impact communal well-being (McDonough and Braungart 9). In addition to fighting 
against the antiquated perception that environmental reforms have to hinder economic 
opportunities, the state and federal agencies tasked with enforcing these regulations are 
continually subjected to budget cuts and public scrutiny from lax enforcement while industry 
leaders tie up court cases in litigation2 and pay lobbyists millions to advocate against stricter 
environmental standards. While the Clean Water Act and President’s Climate Action Plan have 
had their respective successes when faced with industry opponents and economic naysayers, they 
are “fatally limited” policies that enable continued pollution by using environmental policies as a 
political bargaining chip rather than collaborative efforts to actually reform both environmental 
and economic practices (McDonough and Braungart 65). As Miller notes in “A Humanistic 
Rationale for Technical Writing,” technical writing is not intended to be “a set of techniques for 
accommodating slippery words to intractable things,” as is often the case in the political 
stratagem of policy-making (617). Rather, technical writing should be a unifying force of 
2 Such as the lawsuit that the US Department of Justice filed against American Electric Power 
that lasted 8 years, or the recently settled lawsuit filed by the EPA and Department of Justice 
against Duke Energy that took 15 years.  
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identification, “an understanding of how to belong to a community,” and “contribute to a more 
fruitful appreciation and critical understanding of two central forces in our culture, science and 
technology themselves” (Miller 617). Reforms should act as a rhetorical collaborative bridge 
between government, public, and industry rather than a binary divide between these sectors.  
This chapter highlights the systemic flaws of environmental reform in the US by 
specifically focusing on the framework of the CWA and CAP, how polluters operate under these 
reforms, and how these reforms and polluters affect communal well-being and state resources. I 
will particularly emphasize the disparaging gap in environmental legislation regarding coal-
fueled facilities and coal ash storage, borne from the misaligned framework of the CWA. Much 
like Tokyo’s rampant dioxin and carbon dioxide pollution that led to increased environmental 
awareness and collaborative reforms, it is my hope that this research into the legislative chasm 
that frames reforms illuminates the need for collaborative policies that bring together 
environmental, economic, and public interests to enhance the quality of life rather than 
advancing a political agenda. My emphasis on these areas in particular will expose the 
fundamental difference in the theoretical frameworks of the Japanese reforms explored in my 
first chapter, as compared to the theoretical frameworks of US reforms. It is my contention that 
despite the admirable intentions of the CWA and CAP, both negatively impact cultural well-
being due to their reliance on partisan political support; rather than addressing cultural 
shortcomings in industry, environmental, and communal practices, the rhetoric of both the CWA 
and CAP distances the government from the public, the public from industries, and the public 
from responsibility and involvement in these policies that aim to protect public wellbeing. 
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Lacking Enforcement: Industry Leaders Continue Polluting Practices 
Although the dangers and toxicity of coal and its byproducts have been well documented, 
the United States has lacked legislation regulating the use and storage of coal and wet coal ash. 
This is particularly concerning for the US, as an estimated 39 percent of America’s energy is 
generated from coal, according to a 2014 study conducted by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. Moreover, the Union of Concerned Scientists notes that coal is the single largest 
source of air pollution in the US despite the emphasis on improving national ambient air quality 
standards and clean energy solutions in the Climate Action Plan (“Coal Generates” n.p.). 
Additionally, according to 2013 study conducted by the Political Economy Research Institute 
(PERI), four of the top 12 water polluters are leading power companies with active coal-powered 
facilities, and three of these facilities are in the top four greenhouse gas emitters (“Toxic 100 
Water Polluters” n.p.). While pollution is a timeless issue of local, national, and global concern, 
the pattern of continued and increased pollution and environmental disasters at the hands of 
industry leaders is particularly alarming.   
As the fifth largest energy producer, top greenhouse gas emitter, and second largest water 
polluter in the US, American Electric Power has been at odds with environmental reform 
initiatives for the better part of the last two decades (McMahon n.p.; “Toxic 100 Water 
Polluters” n.p.). Founded in 1906 and serving 38 states nationally, AEP has reduced its reliance 
on coal-fueled facilities over the past few years, but still expects to rely on its aging coal-
powered plants for an estimated 51 percent of its power generation by 2020. While that figure is 
down from the staggering 65 percent coal power generation from 2012, it is an increase from the 
initial estimate of 46 percent that AEP published to conform to EPA guidelines regarding older 
coal facilities (Matyi n.p.). Moreover, of the 44 coal units designated as high hazard after EPA 
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review in 2009, 11 are owned by AEP. Similarly, AEP’s industry rival Duke Energy, the nation’s 
leading energy producer, owns 12 of the high hazard coal units examined in the EPA’s 2009 
review while toppling in as the 12th largest water polluter in the country (“EPA’s 44 High Hazard 
Units” n.p.; “Toxic 100 Water Polluters” n.p.). Like AEP, Duke has also taken steps to reduce its 
environmental burden, such as scheduling older, hazardous plants for closing and installing 
sulfur dioxide scrubbers to reduce emissions, but little has been done by these polluters, or the 
EPA for that matter, to curb coal ash pollution and clean up the communal waters decimated by 
the energy industry. To put water pollution in perspective, the EPA estimates that  
72 percent of all toxic water pollution in the country comes from coal-fired power 
plants, making coal the number one source of toxic water pollution in the US. 
What’s more, four out of five coal plants in the US have no limits on the amount 
of toxics they are allowed to dump into our water. Coal plants across the country 
are disposing of toxic heavy metals like arsenic, selenium, boron, cadmium, 
mercury, and lead in our waterways, polluting our drinking water, fishing areas, 
and local rivers and streams. Research has shown that exposure to these 
dangerous chemicals can lead to birth defects, cancer, and even death – meaning 
that limiting these pollutants will not only clean up our water, but will also save 
lives. (“Toxic Metals” n.p.)  
Despite this startling evidence of industrial negligence that has proven detrimental to public 
health, Bill Price with the West Virginia Sierra Club comments that “Sadly, even the EPA has 
acknowledged that protections are woefully out of date” (“WV Groups Secure Coal Pollution” 
n.p.).While the CWA has revitalized the waterways of many industrial communities, it is limited 
to a controversial and often questioned definition of “navigable waters” that has led to a power 
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struggle between political parties, industry stakeholders, and environmental agencies. The CWA 
itself fails to define “navigable waters,” merely stating in section 101 that “it is the national goal 
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985” (3). Though 
various amendments and sections have been added to the CWA, it has yet to clearly define what 
qualifies as “navigable waters,” and the confusion surrounding the CWA’s scope has distanced 
both public and private sectors from supporting the policy. A February 2015 Forbes article 
accurately expresses the tension and divided support of the CWA and continued water pollution 
regulations, stating that “federal agencies want to give themselves almost boundless power over 
a vast amount of private property” in regards to recent attempts to redefine US waterways under 
the CWA (Leef n.p.). Moreover, the article later states “Congress likes to write vague laws that 
leave the hard part to bureaucrats who don’t have to worry about being voted out of office if their 
rules do a lot of harm” (Leef n.p.). The comments of Price from the Sierra Club and Leef from 
Forbes display the discord between political and economic stakeholders affected by the CWA, as 
both feel misrepresented by the reform. Furthermore, these comments echo McDonough and 
Braungart’s assessment of “fatally limited,” cradle-to-grave environmental reform that focuses 
on “one-size-fits-all tools and systems,” and “expects to use materials and chemicals and energy” 
as has always been used in the past (165). As explored in the next section, this archaic method of 
reform that ignores societal and industrial changes only hurts communal well-being rather than 
enhancing it.   
Examining the Cost of the Collaborative Gap: Communities in Danger 
The high cost of the system stems from the need to create and maintain a credible 
threat of punishment and, relatedly, compelling evidence of performance 
effectiveness. People will only change their behavior when they feel that there is a 
reasonable risk of being caught and punished for wrongdoing, both when they are 
personally considering rule-breaking and when they are evaluating whether they 
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believe that the authorities are effectively managing the problem of crime and 
social order in their community.  
          —Tom R. Tyler, 2011 
As Tyler notes in his 2011 work Why People Cooperate, there has to be a realistic, 
authoritative threat of punishment to curb wrongdoing and command social order in the 
community. Additionally, Tyler emphasizes the importance of communal support for policies, as 
a system without both established order and communal support is “fatally limited” in its scope 
and effect. Tyler states that “government depends upon the goodwill and buy-in of most of the 
members of the community most of the time… They need to create and implement public 
policies with an awareness of how the public views those policies” (140). The section below 
focuses on communities that have been and continue to be negatively impacted from legislative 
oversights and gaps within reforms such as the CWA. These communities highlight the human 
impact of reforms and emphasize the need for collaboration underlined in Tyler’s work.   
Kingston, TN 
Despite concerns from environmental groups, including the EPA in 2006, regarding the 
unprecedented above-ground coal ash embankments at the Tennessee Valley Association’s 
Kingston plant,—the largest government owned facility of its kind— the TVA declared its 
facility safe and continued business as usual for the coal-powered plant (Dewan, 2008). Two 
years after these concerns were brushed off, on December 22, 2008, the earthen retaining wall of 
the Kingston plant unexpectedly collapsed. The toxic contents of the 84-acre ash fill spewed into 
the nearby Emory River and across over 300 acres, killing hundreds of fish, uprooting trees, and 
decimating approximately two dozen homes, as shown in Figure 3 below (EarthJustice, 2014). 
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Environmentalists have estimated that 
over 525 million gallons of wet coal ash 
has polluted tributaries of the Tennessee 
River, which serves as the vital water 
supply to millions (Chattanoogan, 2008). 
While water samples from areas 
surrounding the spill have passed EPA 
guidelines, the possibility of detrimental 
health effects due to millions of gallons of toxic materials being released remains a lasting 
concerns. Moreover, a report released by the EPA in 2007 “found that fly ash, a byproduct of the 
burning of coal to produce electricity, does contain significant amounts of carcinogens and 
retains the heavy metal present in coal in far higher concentrations” (Dewan n.p.). The TVA, 
though, did not think the spill warranted public safety warnings. TVA spokesperson Gilbert 
Francis Jr. even said “‘Most of that material is inert. It does have some heavy metals within it, 
but it’s not toxic or anything.’” The heavy metals in coal ash that Francis refers to include 
“arsenic, lead and selenium,” and have been known to “cause cancer and neurological problems” 
(Dewan n.p.) Perhaps more alarming than Francis’ comment regarding the nontoxicity of heavy 
metals is his blatant denial of ecological harm from the spill. Indeed, despite multiple reports and 
television coverage “of a large fish kill downstream of the spill,” Francis and the TVA 
maintained that no fish had perished from the spill (Dewan n.p.). Additionally, the cost of 
cleaning up the spill has been overwhelming, totaling over $1.2 billion and still counting eight 
years after the incident (Dewan n.p.; “On 5th Anniversary” n.p.). As early as 2000, the EPA 
considered imposing stiffer federal regulations regarding coal ash storage, but decided against 
Figure 3 – Fifteen homes were destroyed as a result 
of the collapse of an earthen retaining wall at the 
Kingston Plant (Dewan, n.p.) 
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these controls when faced with aggressive opposition from industry leaders and the Clinton 
administration. In considering these stricter regulations, the EPA asked Edison Electric Institute 
to estimate the industry cost of coal ash cleanup, assuming the EPA’s new regulations would 
redefine coal ash as a hazardous substance. Edison estimated that such a large level cleanup 
effort would cost the industry $5 billion (Dewan n.p.). Eight years later, a single spill costs over 
20 percent of the industry’s estimated cleanup total, excluding the ecological and communal 
damage that resulted from the spill.  
Eden, NC 
On February 2, 2014, the southeastern US faced yet another coal ash spill when the pipe 
beneath Duke Energy’s Dan River Power Station ruptured. While this spill was significantly 
smaller in magnitude than the 2008 Kingston tragedy, 
the spill sent approximately 30,000-39,000 tons of 
coal ash and “24 million gallons of wastewater” 
surging into the Dan River, as displayed in Figure 4 to 
the right (“Southeast Coal Ash Waste” n.p.). More 
alarming for citizens and environmentalists alike have 
been the developments that have come to light since 
the spill, which ruined a deal that Duke was attempting 
to reach with the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 
Though Duke had been warned about the pipe that erupted multiple times, including in 1986, 
1996, 2001, and 2006, they failed to replace the pipe and had been seeking a deal with the DENR 
“over a lawsuit brought by environmentalists charging the company with allowing its 33 coal ash 
ponds in the state to befoul North Carolinians’ groundwater. The lawsuit settlement would’ve 
Figure 4- Coal ash sludge pulled from 
the bottom of the Dan River following 
the Duke Energy spill (Catanoso, n.p.) 
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fined Duke $99,100, without any accompanying requirement to clean up the pollution” (“Duke 
Energy Fined” n.p.; Spross n.p.). As with the Kingston disaster, the Dan River spill has 
threatened the well-being of wildlife and humanity alike, but has also brought to light the 
negligence of government organizations in enforcing the CWA. The DENR failed protect North 
Carolinians’ vital groundwater and failed to protect the interest of its citizens; rather, the DENR 
simply sought a fine from Duke Energy before the spill drew major media attention, and ignored 
the potential ramifications of repeated environmental trespasses.  
Asheville, NC 
In the wake of these environmental 
travesties, Duke Energy’s Asheville plants are 
particularly concerning. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the Kingston spill, the Asheville 
plant’s 90 acres of wet coal ash storage, shown 
in Figure 5 to the left, have loomed large for 
environmentalists lobbying for stricter 
legislation. The Asheville plant is 6 acres larger 
than the affected ash storage area of the 
Kingston plant, which caused the largest coal 
ash spill in the nation’s history and was 
estimated to be 30-40 times larger than the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Moreover, the plant 
was examined by EPA officials in 2008 and labeled as a high hazard area, which “indicates that a 
dam failure is likely to cause loss of human life” (Dewan n.p.; “Southeast Coal Ash Waste” n.p.).  
Furthermore, while the water quality standards of nearby waterways have met all EPA guidelines 
Figure 5 – The overwhelming amount of coal 
ash in the Asheville plant is rivaled only by its 
proximity to the river, on the left (Carolina 
Public Press, 2014) 
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since the Kingston spill, various samples taken from by the French Broad Riverkeeper  during 
the 2011 study conducted by Duke University have confirmed elevated toxin levels outside of 
the EPA’s range of drinking water standards (Vengosh and Dwyer, n.p.). A spill similar to the 
Kingston disaster would not only devastate the delicate ecological habitat of the French Broad 
Watershed, it would also diminish Asheville’s booming tourism, which is the city’s top form of 
economic income and brings in approximately $783 million annually for Buncombe County 
(“Buncombe County Tourism” 3). Moreover, the French Broad’s environmental wellbeing 
affects more than just Asheville and the surrounding areas. According to the United States 
Geological Survey, pollution from the French Broad reaches the Tennessee River sub-basins, 
which supply drinking water to millions (“Water Quality” n.p.). Not only does the French Broad 
serve 87,000 Asheville citizens, thousands of tourists, and an abundance of aquatic species, but it 
also affects communities and ecological habitats connected by tributaries.  
In January 2013, samples taken by the French Broad Riverkeeper showed elevated levels 
of coal combustion waste from the nearby Duke Energy coal-fueled power plant, adjacent to the 
French Broad River (“Asheville Coal Waste” n.p.). Additionally, well samples of ground and 
drinking water near the French Broad contained elevated levels of toxic metals while samples 
from a stream on the power plant’s land had elevated levels of arsenic (“NC Riverkeepers” n.p.). 
The Asheville plant, adjacent to the French Broad River, is the site of two decades old, unlined 
wet coal ash ponds that stretch over 90 acres. The Western North Carolina Alliance estimates 
that leakage from the older storage pond could be up to one million gallons per day, while a 2011 
study conducted by Duke University found that “coal ash waste flowing to the French Broad 
River in Asheville contained arsenic levels more than four times higher than the EPA drinking 
water standard, and selenium levels 17 times higher than the agency’s standard for aquatic life” 
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(Lucas-Duke n.p.). While the EPA has linked elevated levels of these contaminants to cancer, 
intestinal and kidney issues, liver damage, and neurological disorders, the larger threat to human 
and aquatic wellbeing is the potential collapse of the two decades old dams that are currently 
holding over 2.25 million tons of toxic wet coal ash (“Arsenic Compounds” n.p.). Furthermore, 
the older of the two dams, built in 1964, was the only coal ash impoundment  in the nation that 
received a poor-below standards rating from the EPA in 2009 (Igleman n.p.). As Figure 6 below 
shows, toxicity levels in the French 
Broad River have been escalating 
since the coal-fired Asheville plant 
added scrubbers, which were 
designed to reduce emissions, 
according to Duke Energy (“Coal 
Plant Scrubbers” n.p.; “Duke Energy 
Actions” n.p.). If left unmonitored, 
the aging dams and increasing water 
toxicity levels pose significant threats to the surrounding populace and ecological habitats, and 
could result in death, destruction, and millions of dollars in cleanup efforts.  
Continued point source pollution from industry and lax enforcement of the Clean Water 
Act threatens not only the ecology of the French Broad but also the health of the surrounding 
area. Hartwell Carson, the French Broad Riverkeeper, estimates that there are 137 permits to 
discharge wastewater into the French Broad. Of these permits, Kelly Martin with the Sierra Club 
says that Duke Energy “doesn’t have a license to discharge polluted wastewater from its leaking 
coal ash ponds along the French Broad River” (“Asheville Coal Waste” n.p.). Moreover, Carson 
Figure 6 – Toxic water pollution has increased since the 
installation of scrubbers to the Asheville plant (“Coal 
Plant Scrubbers” n.p.) 
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is highly critical of the earthen dams that hold back millions of tons of toxic wet coal ash, stating 
“Earthen dams leak and this outdated and irresponsible disposal system is allowing pollutants to 
seep into the French Broad River” (“Asheville Coal Waste” n.p.). Amelia Burnette of the 
Southern Environmental Law Center and Donna Lisenby of the Waterkeeper Alliance have 
similarly criticized the lack of regulations governing coal ash storage. The Asheville coal ash 
storage ponds both lack protective liners and leachate collection systems, meaning that decades 
of coal ash collection has been steadily leaking into the surrounding French Broad and 
groundwater basin, and the ash coal storage ponds are situated directly on top of buried streams 
that feed into the French Broad River (“Southeast Coal Ash Wate” n.p.).   
Examining the Legislative Paths 
While the Clean Water Act marked a victory for environmentalists nationwide when it 
was first introduced, gaps in enforcement and strained agency resources have led to plateaued 
environmental gains. As environmentalist Clifford Rechtschaffen notes from his 2004 study, “In 
the absence of enforcement, laws alone pack little punch. In the case of the Clean Water Act, the 
federal government relies on state agencies to enforce many of the key provisions of the law” 
(1). Rechstschaffen later goes on to say that such reliance on understaffed and underfunded state 
agencies to enforce the Clean Water Act has proven “woefully inadequate” (1). Moreover, an 
article by The New York Times found that while more than a half million water pollution 
violations have occurred since 2004, “the vast majority of those polluters have escaped 
punishment” (Duhigg n.p.). Additionally, the article notes that “state officials have repeatedly 
ignored obvious illegal dumping, and the Environmental Protection Agency, which can 
prosecute polluters when states fail to act, has often declined to intervene” (Duhigg n.p.). 
Although the concerns raised by Rechtschaffen’s study and Duhigg’s article are not confined to 
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the US,—indeed, the Fukushima disaster and subsequent concerns over water safety have raised 
similar risks throughout Japan—the continued pressure on state and federal agencies to regulate 
and enforce environmental policies with limited resources is overwhelming. Moreover, this 
continued pressure has resulted in lax enforcement of industrial pollution trespasses, and has 
shown to be more than these regulatory agencies can handle.   
In December 2014, the EPA announced that it had finalized national regulations in the 
Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, the first federal regulations ever 
to be instituted on coal ash. These regulations seek to limit the risks of “coal ash disposal . . . the 
rule sets out recordkeeping and reporting requirements as well as the requirement for each 
facility to establish and post specific information to a publicly-accessible website” (“Final Rule” 
n.p.). By forcing companies to report findings on a publicly-accessible website, these 
groundbreaking regulations place information at the fingertips of the public, although the 
corporate-reported information itself is questionable. In response to these regulations, Sierra 
Club director Mary Anne Hitt commented that “While EPA and the Obama administration have 
taken a modest first step by introducing some protections on the disposal of coal ash, they do not 
go far enough to protect families from this toxic pollution” (Cama n.p.). Like its Clean Water 
Act predecessor, these regulations are to be enforced at the state level, though handed down to 
state agencies by the EPA. Furthermore, “The EPA also decided not to go as far as classifying 
coal ash as hazardous, saving utilities billions of dollars in commonplace costs and disappointing 
environmentalists,” and instead “coal ash will be subject to disposal rules similar to trash” (Cama 
n.p.). Moreover, in examining the CWA itself, Emergency Powers Section 504(a) states that 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Administrator upon receipt 
of evidence that a pollution source or combination of sources is presenting an 
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imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare 
of persons where such endangerment is to the livelihood of such persons, such as 
inability to market shellfish, may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the 
appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person causing or 
contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the discharge or pollutants causing or 
contributing to such pollution or take such other action as may be necessary. (216) 
Although Section 504 advocates against pollution sources that endanger public health or 
livelihood, it places accountability on the legal system to take action, and this displacement of 
accountability has resulted in lengthy and expensive court battles that strain the limited financial 
resources of environmental agencies who are opposing profitable industries. Though the courts 
are the correct channel for due process for both civil and criminal suits, the Emergency Powers 
section of the CWA fails to mention any amendment efforts to curb further pollution sources that 
may result in similar cases. Essentially, the rhetoric of the Emergency Powers section distances 
federal responsibility from amending the CWA to further protect public wellbeing while 
enabling further pollution; enacting these ‘Emergency Powers’ then is to engage in potentially 
years’ worth of court cases and legal fees in the hopes of changing the rhetoric of CWA to 
recognize emergent situations and protect against future harm, but with no guarantee of change. 
To echo Hitt’s comments, these regulations are insufficient to protect public and ecological 
health from continuing harm. Rather, they distance regulatory and industry leaders from 
accountability and enable continued pollution. For example, while Duke Energy has faced its 
share of lawsuits and was recently fined $102 million and “pleaded guilty . . . to nine criminal 
violations of the Clean Water Act for polluting four major rivers for several years with toxic coal 
ash from five power plants in North Carolina,” Duke still has open power plants that are actively 
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polluting waterways, and the CWA still lacks legislation regarding coal ash (Zucchino, n.p.). 
Though the CWA has enabled the prosecution of corporations such as Duke Energy and has been 
a rhetorical landmark to show that “‘big corporations are not above the law, and polluters who 
harm our environment will be held accountable,’” its rhetorical effectiveness has been reduced to 
hindsight (Zucchino n.p.).  
Despite these noticeable gaps in these new regulations, the EPA’s decision to at least 
place regulations on coal ash storage and disposal reflects the growing public concern over coal 
ash and its hazards, and mirrors the public concern that led to the CWA. Indeed, much like the 
burning Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, which brought national attention to lacking water safety 
standards and gave rise to the CWA, the coal ash pollution problem in the US highlights the 
lacking legislation regarding coal ash storage and subsequent leachate water contamination that 
risks public and ecological health. Moreover, the recent coal ash spills and concerns demonstrate 
the overwhelming need for collaborative technical writing in reforms. As Longo notes, “When 
scientific workers can be shaped by the social power of technical writing, they become like the 
writing itself, instruments of knowledge production and appraisal in a stabilized economic 
system” (3).  The greatest power of these reforms is their ability to unify communities and 
disciplines through writing, and knowledge production is a critical product of this unification. 
Without this holistic unification, reforms are simply one-dimensional versions of partisan 
technical writing that Longo characterizes as “the spoils of war” and Miller calls “intellectual 
coercion;” they ignore the humanistic aspect of technical writing, the wide-reaching communal 
effects of reforms, and the subjectivity inherent within writing (Longo 15; Miller 613). Rather 
than unifying scientific and humanistic disciplines, these reforms privilege a singular view and 
politicize these views as competing parts of a divided knowledge economy. For example, while 
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the CWA has been an environmentally successful reform in terms of reducing pollution, its 
scope is limited to a loose and often debated definition of “navigable waters” that tends to be 
redefined with each swing in political power (Neuhauser n.p.). Longo later explains that the 
cultural role of technical writing as a stabilizing implement in the scientific knowledge economy 
has been inadequately researched. She states that 
After years of research, technical writing professionals cannot fully answer 
questions about how technical discourse participates in culturally grounded 
contests for knowledge and power. We cannot explain why ideas and practices 
that were legitimate less than 100 years ago are no longer legitimate. We do not 
understand how technical writing provides a currency for scientific knowledge. 
How can communication researchers uncover institutional systems of discourse 
formation that will help us address these uncovered issues? We can begin by 
examining how a research model based on critical theory provides a vocabulary 
and framework for researchers to discuss issues of knowledge and power. (4) 
Indeed, this is the very issue that plagues reforms like the CWA; while politically present in 
environmental discourse, the CWA has a diminishing cultural role with scant knowledge 
production and increasing political discord. For instance, Section 102 (e) of the CWA’s Research 
and Related Programs Declaration of Goals and Policy states that “Public participation in the 
development, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or 
program established by the Administrator or any State under this Act shall be provided for, 
encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States” (4). Despite this declaration for 
public participation, the rhetoric of the CWA does little to actually encourage public 
participation, although this participation is a stated goal of the Act. As Longo notes, we do not 
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understand how to utilize technical writing as a form of currency in the knowledge economy, nor 
do we understand the cultural value of this communication (4). Instead of valuing this 
communication as a form of currency, the rhetoric of the CWA distances the public from 
participation in this knowledge economy by leaving the extent and role of the public undefined. 
The significance and goals of public participation in the CWA is not outlined in a separate 
program or distinct role, but merely “shall be provided for, encouraged, and” have “minimum 
guidelines” (4). Ultimately, this fading epistemic recognition is rooted in environmental reform 
history rather than cultural currency; it is a rhetorical relic of the way things were done rather 
than a beacon of how things can be done.  
The Climate Action Plan 
On a national level, the President’s Climate Action Plan (CAP) is highly ambitious and 
aims to bridge the collaborative gap between policy, business, and environment. In short, it is a 
national bundle of progressive plans, such as the Clean Power Plan, that champions clean, 
renewable energy as a means to improve national health and industry by creating a clean energy 
infrastructure for generations to build upon (“Climate Action Plan 2nd Anniversary” 17). While 
the collaborative sentiment is appealing, the scope of this project lacks the necessary collective 
backing to achieve its goals. For example, the CAP sets out to “reduce US GHG emissions 
[greenhouse gases] by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 if all other major economies agreed to 
limit their emission as well ” (Leggett n.p.). Indeed, the caveat at the end of this CAP initiative 
emphasizes the collaborative uncertainty within this reform. Additionally, these goals are 
designed to support the American family and aim to “protect the health of American families,” 
boost the economy, and decrease the financial burden of the average American family (“Clean 
Power Plan” n.p.). Despite these goals, the EPA’s budget was cut by $718 million, roughly 9 
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percent, in 2015, and the EPA is currently operating with about $1.2 billion less than President 
Obama had originally requested in his budget projections. This means that for yet another year, 
the EPA is being asked to do more with fewer resources, and, as the CAP outlines, national 
health and sustainable economic infrastructure are relying on every penny (Henry n.p.). Budget 
cuts have been a common theme in environmental reforms despite growing concerns over 
climate change and increased health hazards. Indeed, according to journalist Charles Clark of the 
Government Executive, the EPA’s budget has been slashed for the fifth year in a row. 
Consequently, the EPA’s staff has been reduced to its lowest total since 1989 (Clark n.p.). Local 
agencies are feeling the pinch too, despite growing expectations of stricter environmental 
regulation enforcement. Take the North Carolina Department of Environmental Resources 
(NCDENR) for example. As Graham Kates, Deputy Managing Editor of The Crime Report, 
notes, “Between 2009 and 2014, the NCDENR’s regulatory staff was slashed more than 37 
percent, from 4,691 employees statewide to 2,936” (n.p.). Additionally, Kates found that 
corporate trespasses on environmental regulations rarely result in investigation or punishment 
(n.p.). As of 2014, “More than 64,000 facilities are currently listed in agency databases as being 
in violation of federal environmental laws, but in most years, fewer than one-half of one percent 
of violations trigger criminal investigations, according to EPA records” (Kates n.p.). Although 
the CAP is step towards collaborative reforms, it lacks the necessary financial backing to build a 
sustainable environmental reform foundation. Without the necessary resources for agencies such 
as the EPA and NCDENR to help the American family, as stated as part of its goals, the CAP is 
essentially political fodder. As Tyler points out,  
The high cost of the system stems from the need to create and maintain a credible 
threat of punishment and, relatedly, compelling evidence of performance 
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effectiveness. People will only change their behavior when they feel that there is 
reasonable risk of being caught and punished for wrongdoing, both when they are 
personally considering rule-breaking and when they are evaluating whether they 
believe that the authorities are effectively managing the problem of crime and 
social order in their community.  (71) 
While the President’s Climate Action Plan has honorable intentions, it lacks the foundational 
financial resources and industrial cooperation to enforce regulations and foster progress. Without 
this buy-in, reforms such as the CAP are epistemologically limited in their ability to provide “a 
currency for scientific knowledge,” as Longo notes (4).  
Conclusion 
The largest barrier to success with the Clean Water Act and the President’s Climate 
Action Plan has been incorporating stakeholders and key political figures to agree upon and 
disseminate resources for implementation and sustainable support. Both reforms rely on federal 
and local agencies, such as the EPA and NCDENR, for enforcement despite the annual budget 
cuts faced by many environmental agencies. Moreover, the public has been widely excluded 
from these reforms that directly impact public and ecological health, economic trends, and tax 
dollar allocation. Although the Japanese environmental reforms discussed in chapter one are 
hardly flawless, they do establish a collaborative pipeline of support clearly lacking in the 
frameworks for the CWA and CAP.  
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CHAPTER THREE - COHESION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SUSTAINABILITY: WHAT 
HAVE WE LEARNED AND WHERE CAN THIS TAKE US? 
Underlying our policy analysis is the view that government depends upon the 
goodwill and buy-in of most of the members of the community most of the time. 
This means that government authorities must be sensitive to the appearance of 
fairness, as well as to its reality. They need to create and implement public 
policies with an awareness of how the public views those policies. . . when it 
makes policies, the government needs to be cognizant of more than just the 
objective quality of those policies; it also needs to be aware of how their creation 
and implementation is viewed by the public at large.    
—Tom Tyler, 2011 
As noted in Tyler’s cooperation theory, governmental policies need public buy-in to 
succeed, and gaining public buy-in means gaining public trust and acceptance (140). While the 
Clean Water Act and President’s Climate Action Plan incorporate various levels of industrial and 
political input, they lack the communal aspect addressed in Tokyo’s 10-Year Plan and Japan’s 
Fun to Share program. This chapter focuses on the policy models analyzed thus far and how they 
compare to the theoretical approaches of Tyler, Longo, and Miller. Additionally, this chapter 
examines the long-term sustainability of the current US model of environmental policy and 
posits a new collaborative model based on the theories of Tyler, Longo, and Miller. 
Environmental Policies in Japan and the US: What’s Working and What Needs Work 
When the TMG first introduced the 10-Year Plan in 2006, it was presented to  
Tokyoites as a full-scale change from the lifestyle they had grown accustomed to. The crowded 
highways and transportation systems, dioxin-fueled smog clouds, and scarce greenery that had 
come to define Tokyo gave way to a more communally-focused design that emphasized 
expanding the city’s greenery, alleviating traffic congestion, and reducing CO2 emissions 
(“History of Tokyo” n.p.; “Eight” n.p.). While these items seem standard for environmental 
policy, the TMG took the 10-Year Plan a gigantic step farther; they included public wellness 
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programs such as “The Fund to Ensure Health and Welfare, “The Continuing Education 
Scholarship,” and “The Fund to Promote Sports and Cultural Exchanges” in the 10-Year Plan’s 
budget. By prioritizing communal wellbeing, the TMG integrated environmental health with 
communal health. Moreover, industry is central to the 10-Year Plan, and the TMG allotted 33.6 
billion yen, $337 million U.S., to help businesses achieve the new environmental standards 
(“Japan” n.p.). The TMG has employed a multipronged environmental policy that also addresses 
communal and industrial involvement to establish trust and cooperation, the building blocks of 
successful collaboration. As Tyler notes,  
it is the procedural justice of government actions/trustworthiness of government 
authorities that generalizes to shape views about law and government (Tyler, 
Casper, and Fisher 1989). Hence, when it makes policies, the government needs 
to not only be sensitive to the objective quality of those policies but to how their 
creation and implementation is viewed by the public. (82) 
It is not only the outcomes achieved and dollars spent that matter in policy, but also, and more 
significantly, the thoughtful design and execution of these policies that influence public opinion, 
trust, and cooperation. Specifically with the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020, the TMG used its 
citizens as an impetus for creation and implementation; the TMG launched the 10-Year Plan as 
“Tokyo’s Big Change” followed by Tokyo Vision 2020, and used the rhetoric of both reforms to 
involve Tokyoites, both in activities such as tree plantings and athletic events, and in the policies 
themselves, such job creation initiatives, educational and childcare support, and health and 
wellness programs. In short, the 10-Year Plan and Vision 2020 utilize rhetoric to gain communal 
cooperation and support as a means of leading healthy, positive change.   
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Conversely, the CAP is a heaping amalgamation of policies and programs that talk about 
communal change without incorporating the actual community. For example, although one of the 
initiatives in the CAP is to build “stronger and safer communities” as a means of “preparing the 
United States for the impacts of climate change,” this section of the CAP only acknowledges 
elected officials as members of  the “state, local, and tribal leaders task force on Climate 
Preparedness and Resilience” (“Climate Action Plan” 2). Moreover, this section fails to address 
specific methods of policy implementation. Although the CAP Progress Report mentions that 
“up to $600,000 in training and technical assistance” will be allocated “to help drinking water, 
wastewater, and storm water utilities in more than 20 communities bolster their climate change 
resilience and readiness,” there is no further mention of specific implementation plans (“Progress 
Report” 6). Additionally, the communities deemed deserving of these funds and the elected 
officials of the Climate Preparedness task force are operating within an extremely limited 
collaborative scope. For example, while the Fun to Share program is fundamentally rooted in the 
idea of interconnected networks of experience and sharing,—a rather broad collaborative scope 
that utilizes community members, students, and industries across the country to further the 
program—the Climate Preparedness task force of the CAP is limited to the preferences of its task 
force, comprised of elected officials that are already involved in government rather than 
community members, who are left to observe and make judgements about the process and 
outcomes from which they were excluded. While this is one section of the CAP, other sections 
do little to encourage participation, and even its full name, the President’s Climate Action Plan, 
is limiting compared to the unifying cultural sentiments of the Tokyo 10-Year Plan and Tokyo 
Vision 2020.  
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The CWA is in a similar situation when it comes to inspiring collaboration. Indeed, with 
all of the budget cuts to state and federal agencies tasked with enforcing the CWA despite 
dwindling resources that enable lax enforcement, the CWA has become virtually a pointless 
policy. In discussing cooperation with authorities, Tyler comments that:  
The high cost of the system stems from the need to create and maintain a credible 
threat of punishment and, relatedly, compelling evidence of performance 
effectiveness. People will only change their behavior when they feel that there is a 
reasonable risk of being caught and punished for wrongdoing, both when they are 
personally considering rule-breaking and when they are evaluating whether they 
believe that they authorities are effectively managing the problem of crime and 
social order in their community. (71) 
According to Tyler’s theory, then, the CWA is essentially perpetuating systemic failure and 
environmental attacks. Though companies such as Duke Energy and American Electric Power, 
for example, have had to shell out millions as a result of their spills and noncompliance, their 
fines pale in comparison to their profits. These companies will continue polluting and 
endangering communities because the “reasonable risk of being caught and punished for 
wrongdoing” is negligible (Tyler 71). Moreover, returning to Tyler’s comments regarding policy 
creation and implementation, the CWA again fails “to not only be sensitive to the objective 
quality of those policies but to how their creation and implementation is viewed by the public” 
(82). Whereas policies such as the 10-Year Plan and Fun to Share prioritize public involvement 
and approval in policy “creation and implementation” as a means of gaining public buy-in and 
collaborative support, the CWA and CAP isolate communal wellbeing and involvement as an 
unnecessary burden in authoritatively controlled systemic policies.  
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Although Japan’s environmental policies are far from perfect, they at least acknowledge 
and prioritize communal involvement and wellbeing. Like Tyler, Longo’s work recognizes the 
need for collaboration within our epistemological framework:  
Discourse becomes a struggle mediated by culture. Technical writing participates 
in that struggle by working to assign value to scientific knowledge, thereby 
minting the currency for its economy. Devalued knowledge, like a counterfeit 
coin, will not circulate widely in this economy; highly valued knowledge will 
circulate widely as the genuine coin. (15-16) 
Without these collaborative efforts, the rhetorical and cultural value of policies such as the CWA 
and CAP are akin to counterfeit coinage; they merely damage the knowledge economy rather 
than aiding in its growth through valued and circulated knowledge.  
Creating a Sustainable Plan 
While the realm of policy creation and implementation is infiltrated with and essentially 
run by expertly-examined and verified statistics that are then used to justify goals and determine 
success, these measures simply fail to encompass and support the full effects of enacted policies. 
Statistics are an ill-fitted and ill-advised replacement for communal involvement, and are often 
used to legitimize the political victor’s version of knowledge, in an outdated “spoils of war” 
ritual, while the “opponent,” typically stakeholders who have been completely excluded from the 
creation and implementation process despite the far-reaching effects of policy enactment, is 
kicked to the side as inferior (Longo 15). This antiquated form of policy design establishes a 
clear hierarchy of prioritization and essentially characterizes policy enactment as a competition 
rather than enculturation. As Miller elaborates, technical writing is form of communal belonging: 
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To write, to engage in any communication, is to participate in a community; to 
write well is to understand the conditions of one’s own participation—the 
concepts, values, traditions, and style which permit identification with that 
community and determine the success or failure of communication. (617) 
Rather than using policies as an extension of overt, unquestioned authority with a constant 
struggle for supremacy, Miller’s ideals advocate for a shared epistemology rooted in 
collaborative communication. In this format, success is defined not by arbitrary numbers, but by 
participation and social buy-in.  
Additionally, Miller states: 
Science understood as apodictic demonstration demands acknowledgement, an act 
of submission by the audience. Science understood as argument asks for assent, 
for an act of will on the part of the audience. Good technical writing becomes, 
rather than the revelation of absolute reality, a persuasive version of experience. 
To continue to teach as we have, to acquiesce in passing off a version as an 
absolute, is coercive and tyrannical; it is to wrench ideology from belief. Much of 
what we call technical writing occurs in the context of government and industry 
and embodies tacit commitments to bureaucratic hierarchies, corporate capitalism, 
and high technology. If we pretend for a minute that technical writing is objective, 
we have passed off a particular political ideology as privileged truth. (616) 
Since the birth of environmental policy, the US has blindly accepted scientific findings as 
irrefutable, absolute, unbiased truths and has used these findings to create, implement, justify, 
and evaluate policies. These policies force dichotomous submission or opposition, foster discord, 
and polarize stakeholders. In this environment, policies are merely an extension of tyranny, 
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forcing a singular truth in the name of unquestionable science and bureaucratic power. This 
format of policy-making is degenerative rather than sustainable.  
To create a sustainable system of policy creation and implementation, we must 
acknowledge the subjectivity of science and technical writing, and use this subjectivity to our 
advantage. Rather than designing policies to appease the “tacit commitments to bureaucratic 
hierarchies, corporate capitalism, and high technology,” we can use polices as a form of 
“identity” and “enculturation” (Miller 616, 617). Subjectivity, then, becomes a uniting force for 
change. For example, when designing the 10-Year Plan and subsequent Vision 2020, the TMG 
involved, schools, businesses, the working class, the elderly, and leading researchers to create a 
plan that involved all aspects of society. Moreover, by involving these parties, the TMG 
prioritized collaborative buy-in and ensured future progress through this engaged buy-in. As 
Longo notes, in our knowledge-powered economy, “technical writing mints the coin of the 
realm. . . Power and knowledge systems work to bring order to knowledge” (76).  If we examine 
the theories of Tyler, Miller, and Longo, the way forward in governmental policies is clear: 
knowledge and cooperation require communal buy-in, which in turns requires trust in 
governmental authorities and motives. The community must be involved in policy creation and 
implementation that directly affects their livelihood and wellbeing. As the 10-Year Plan, Vision 
2020, and Fun to Share Program demonstrate, environmental policies extend beyond the realm of 
politics and industry; they are rhetorical reforms that influence all aspect of communal 
wellbeing, and were designed to support and progress this wellbeing. Only when we address the 
far-reaching rhetorical effects of reforms and include communal, economic, scholastic, and 
governmental stakeholders can we create reforms that are truly regenerative and sustainable. 
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